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Few school choice evaluations consider students who leave such programs, and fewer still consider 
the effects of leaving these programs as policy-relevant outcomes. Using a representative sample of 
students from the citywide voucher program in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, we analyze more than 1,000 
students who leave the program during a 4-year period. We show that low-performing voucher stu-
dents tend to move from the voucher sector into lower performing and less effective public schools 
than the typical public school student attends, whereas high-performing students transfer to better 
public schools. In general, transferring students realize substantial achievement gains after moving 
to the public sector; these results are robust to multiple analytical approaches. This evidence has 
important implications for school choice policy and research. 
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Student selection is one of the most contro-
versial aspects of school choice policy. The lit-
erature has given prominent attention to the 
characteristics of students who select into various 
alternatives to traditional public schools (Betts & 
Fairlie, 2001; Bifulco & Ladd, 2007; Campbell, 
West, & Peterson, 2005; Fairlie & Resch, 2002; 
Figlio, 2008; Figlio, Hart, & Metzger, 2010; 
Figlio & Stone, 2001; Goldring & Phillips, 2008; 
Howell, 2004; Lankford & Wyckoff, 2001; Long 
& Toma, 1988). Accounting for systematic stu-
dent selection processes is critical for obtaining 
internally valid estimates of the effect of school 
choice programs on educational outcomes. Even 
when threats to internal validity appear minimal, 
differences between the students who select into 
a school choice program and the larger popula-
tion of school children may limit the extent to 
which estimated effects can provide an externally 
valid guide to policymakers looking to replicate 
or expand the program at hand.
Despite the attention devoted to student selec-
tion into various choice programs, there have 
been few studies explicitly concerned with stu-
dents who select out of such programs. Even in an 
educational environment with several schooling 
options, some students will undoubtedly elect to 
remain in, or return to, the traditional public sector 
for a variety of possible reasons. Earlier studies by 
Cowen, Fleming, Witte, & Wolf (2012) and 
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Howell (2004) have analyzed the characteristics 
of individuals who leave voucher programs and 
return to the traditional public sector, but to our 
knowledge, there has been no research that sys-
tematically considers the academic careers of 
former choice students after they have enrolled 
or reenrolled in public schools.1
It is toward this understanding that we are 
focused in the current article. Drawing on data 
from the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
(MPCP) and Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS), 
this article has two objectives. First, we explore 
the characteristics of the public schools that stu-
dents attend when they leave a voucher program 
and enter the public sector. We devote particular 
attention to analyzing the achievement levels 
and effectiveness of the public schools into 
which former voucher students enroll. Such an 
analysis can provide valuable insight into the 
motivations underlying students’ decisions to 
leave the voucher program as well as informa-
tion about the factors that affect the specific 
public school into which a former choice stu-
dent enrolls.
Perhaps inseparable from the school atten-
dance decisions of students who leave a voucher 
program and enroll in public schools are their 
educational outcomes. How does such a transfer 
affect student achievement? Does the effect vary 
by the characteristics of the students or the public 
schools into which they enroll? There is little, if 
any, existing empirical evidence on such ques-
tions. This fact, coupled with competing theoreti-
cal considerations regarding the academic effects 
of intersector transfers, means that the issue must 
be resolved empirically; this resolution repre-
sents the second objective of this article.
Our results indicate that students who leave 
the voucher program and enroll in MPS are dis-
proportionately disadvantaged relative to both 
their new public school peers and typical 
voucher students. After leaving the MPCP, 
low-achieving students tend to enroll in low-
performing, less effective public schools, 
whereas high-achieving students generally 
attend higher performing, more effective schools 
in MPS. However, all students exhibit increased 
levels of achievement in both reading and math-
ematics after transferring, and the magnitudes of 
these increases are not negligible; on average, 
they are in the range of 0.15 to 0.20 standard 
deviations. Focusing on the average effect, 
however, masks the fact that the achievement 
effects of moving from the MPCP to MPS are 
somewhat larger for low-performing students 
than for their higher achieving peers.
These findings have implications for both 
research and policy. With respect to research, 
these results—when considered in concert with 
broader research on the MPCP—are consistent 
with the presence of heterogeneity in the effects 
of school choice programs. They also illustrate 
the importance of explicitly describing the iden-
tifying assumptions of a research design when 
estimating the effect of a choice policy on out-
comes of interest. With respect to policy, the 
results inform issues related to the ability of 
families to select high-quality schools, the poten-
tial stratifying effects of school choice policy, 
and the relative effectiveness of public and pri-
vate schools, at least for the population of stu-
dents examined in this article; these implica-
tions are discussed in more detail in the con-
cluding section of this article.
Background
Begun in 1990, the MPCP is the oldest pub-
licly funded private school voucher program in 
the country. It is also the largest urban voucher 
program, having grown from about 340 students 
enrolled in 7 schools in 1990 to more than 
20,000 students enrolled in more than 100 
schools during the 2010–2011 school year 
(Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 
2012). Studies of the program in its early years—
between 1990 and 1995—uncovered either insig-
nificant (Witte, 2000) or small positive effects on 
student achievement (Greene, Peterson, & Du, 
1998; Lamarche, 2008; Rouse, 1998); the results 
are sensitive to various specification choices. 
Because of statutory provisions, no data were 
collected on the program between 1996 and 
2005, rendering researchers unable to evaluate it 
during this period. However, as directed by the 
program’s 2005 reauthorization (2005 
Wisconsin Act 125, S.B. 618, 2005-2006 
Legislature; 2006), a more recent evaluation 
occurred between 2006 and 2011, with the 
results indicating that in three out of four follow-
up years, the achievement growth of MPCP 
students was no different from the achievement 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016http://eepa.aera.netDownloaded from 
181
Life After Vouchers
growth of a matched group of MPS students 
(Witte, Carlson, Cowen, Fleming, & Wolf, 
2011). However, the official evaluators dis-
cerned a small, positive effect of voucher usage 
on the likelihood of high school graduation and 
enrollment in 4-year colleges (Cowen, Fleming, 
Witte, Wolf, & Kisida, in press). During the con-
duct of this evaluation, it became clear that a 
consequential number of students were leaving 
the MPCP and enrolling in MPS (Cowen et al., 
2012). Specifically, across a 4-year period— 
2006–2007 to 2009–2010—approximately one-
third of the evaluation sample left the MPCP 
and enrolled in MPS.
Such a finding raises several policy-relevant 
issues, with the first-order questions concerning 
the characteristics of these students. What are 
their demographic profiles? How were they per-
forming academically prior to leaving the 
MPCP? What types of schools were these stu-
dents attending in the MPCP prior to leaving the 
voucher program? Such questions served as the 
basis of a paper by Cowen et al. (2012), which 
reported that low-performing students, African 
American students, and students attending 
schools with a high concentration of voucher 
students were disproportionately likely to leave 
the MPCP and enroll in the MPS. These find-
ings echo results presented in Howell’s (2004) 
work, which demonstrates that low-performing 
students, African American students, and less reli-
gious students were disproportionately likely to 
leave a small, privately funded voucher program in 
New York City. In addition, Cowen et al. (2012) 
and Metcalf, West, Legan, Paul, and Boone (2003) 
have found evidence that students who leave 
voucher programs were more likely to have 
considered other sector options earlier in their 
careers, suggesting that such students are gen-
erally more mobile in the first place. Although 
these studies provide valuable insight into the 
characteristics of students who leave voucher 
programs, they provide little information on 
other important issues, such as the schools that 
students attend after enrolling in the public sector 
and their subsequent academic outcomes. Indeed, 
to our knowledge, there has been no systematic 
empirical work on these topics.2
In the absence of any empirical evidence on 
the public school careers of former voucher stu-
dents, one may rely on theoretical considerations 
to guide expectations. In our case, however, 
theory provides only weak guidance about the 
academic effects of leaving a voucher program 
and enrolling in public schools; plausible argu-
ments can be marshaled in support of a wide 
variety of expectations. This ambiguity exists in 
part because myriad factors have the potential to 
affect the academic outcomes of students who 
transfer from private to public schools.
Any transfer from one school to another will 
by definition change the environment in which 
a student is educated. The move from a private 
school to a public one is no exception. Such a 
move will result in a new set of teachers and 
could result in an entirely different curriculum 
prioritizing different learning objectives. The 
administrative structure at the destination public 
school may be quite different from that in the 
private sector, resulting in a climate where teach-
ers and nonteaching staff alike may be participat-
ing in a variety of different leadership roles. 
These factors—and possibly others—affect the 
overall quality of a school, which is an impor-
tant determinant of academic outcomes.
Along with experiencing a change in academic 
environments, students may experience a change 
in the characteristics and quality of their peers. In 
the context of this study, a student who leaves a 
voucher program and enrolls in a public school 
will, by definition, move from being surrounded by 
students whose parents actively chose to enroll 
them in a private school to being surrounded by 
students whose parents did not make that choice. 
Additionally, the demographic, behavioral, and 
academic characteristics of a student’s peers may 
change after a move from the private to the public 
sector. A large body of research has demonstrated 
that peer characteristics and quality can affect stu-
dents’ academic outcomes (Figlio, 2007; 
Hanushek, Kain, Markman, & Rivkin, 2003; 
Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2009; Hoxby, 2000; 
Lefgren, 2004; Zimmer & Toma, 2000).
Sector differences may also affect the aca-
demic outcomes of students who leave a voucher 
program and enroll in the public school system. 
First, achievement outcomes could be affected by 
differences in the general effectiveness of the two 
sectors. If the effects of a voucher program 
are positive (e.g. Barnard, Frangakis, Hill, & Rubin, 
2003; Howell, Peterson, Wolf, & Campbell, 2006; 
Rouse, 1998), the effects of exiting the program 
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and returning to the public sector may be nega-
tive. On the other hand, if voucher impacts are 
largely neutral (e.g., Metcalf et al., 2003; Witte, 
2000) or disproportionately realized by a margin-
ally more advantaged group of students (e.g., Wolf, 
Kisida, Guttmann, Rizzo, & Eissa, 2011), and if 
low performers are those most likely to leave in the 
first place (Cowen et al., 2012; Howell, 2004), 
then perhaps students who give up a voucher are 
simply returning to a schooling environment that 
is simply a better academic fit. There may also 
be policy differences—both formal and infor-
mal—between the two sectors that affect aca-
demic outcomes. Perhaps most notably, private 
schools—unlike public schools—are not subject 
to the accountability provisions of No Child Left 
Behind.3 This disparity has the potential to influ-
ence many factors relevant to academic out-
comes, a sampling of which may include subject 
emphasis, alignment between the curriculum and 
standardized tests (i.e., teaching to the test), and 
perhaps even retention policy.
Further relevant to the academic effects of 
intersector transfers is the literature demonstrat-
ing that switching schools often has a disruptive 
effect on academic achievement (Alexander, 
Entwisle, & Dauber, 1996; Engberg, Gill, 
Zamarro, & Zimmer, 2012; Hanushek, Kain, & 
Rivkin, 2004; Ingersoll, Scamman, & Eckerling, 
1989; Kerbow, Azcoitia, & Buell, 2003; Lash & 
Kirkpatrick, 1990, 1994; Rumberger, Larson, 
Ream, & Palardy, 1999; South, Haynie, & Bose, 
2007; Temple & Reynolds, 1999; Xu, Hannaway, 
& D’Souza, 2009; Zimmer et al., 2009). Regardless 
of the underlying reason, research routinely finds 
school transfers to have a negative effect on stu-
dent achievement, at least initially. There is no 
reason to suspect that this factor will not be at 
play in the context of this article.
Finally, an analysis of the academic effects of 
intersector transfer must recognize the fact that 
switching schools—to say nothing of switching 
sectors—is unlikely to be an exogenous event. It 
is possible that students may be particularly 
likely to leave the voucher program and enroll in 
public school after what amounts to an inordi-
nately poor academic year. In such a scenario, 
any observed increases in post-transfer achieve-
ment could be attributable to simple mean 
reversion. In a related vein, Rumberger et al. 
(1999) note that although student mobility 
occurs for any number of reasons, all transfers 
can usefully be classified as “strategic” or 
“reactive” in nature; each type of transfer has 
different implications for academic outcomes.4
Taken together, the considerations discussed 
above do not support any absolute predictions 
about the effects of intersector transfers on aca-
demic outcomes. The various factors could 
interact in ways to produce academic outcomes 
that are—on average—worse, similar, or better 
for students who leave the voucher program and 
enroll in MPS. To the extent our data allow, we 
explore how the factors discussed above relate 
to any achievement changes that occur when a 
student leaves the voucher program and enrolls 
in public schools.
Data
We use two unique, high-quality data sets to 
track students in both sectors, collect demo-
graphic data on each student and their schools, 
and link students to their math and reading 
standardized test scores. The first of these data 
sets consists of panel data on a sample of MPCP 
students collected as part of the state-mandated 
evaluation of the MPCP that began in 2006 
(2005 Wisconsin Act 125). The data set contains 
a representative sample of approximately 2,700 
students enrolled in the MPCP during the 2006–
2007 school year. This sample consisted of stu-
dents in Grades 3 through 8, stratified by grade, 
and the population of ninth graders. It was 
refreshed with samples of third grade students in 
the voucher program in both 2007–2008 and 
2008–2009, thus totaling nearly 3,500 unique 
student observations.5 In addition to student 
demographics, the data set contains student 
achievement measures from the reading and 
mathematics portions of the Wisconsin 
Knowledge and Concepts Examination (WKCE), 
which is a criterion-referenced exam adminis-
tered in Grades 3 through 8 and Grade 10 that 
the State of Wisconsin uses to comply with fed-
eral No Child Left Behind requirements.6 The 
data also include an identifier for the census tract 
in which the students resided in the year that 
they entered the sample, along with the longi-
tude and latitude of the census tract.
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To track former MPCP students in MPS, we 
examined a second data set, a repeated cross-
section containing information on the universe 
of students enrolled in MPS who took the 
WKCE in the fall of the 2006–2007, 2007–2008, 
2008–2009, 2009–2010, or 2010–2011 aca-
demic years. In addition to the WKCE results, 
the data set contains additional valuable infor-
mation, including standard student demograph-
ics, such as gender, race, grade, free or reduced-
price lunch (FRL) status, English language 
learner status, and special education status. It 
also identifies the school attended by each stu-
dent, which allows us to generate school-level 
characteristics—for all test takers in the school—
such as average school achievement in reading 
and math, the percentage of female students, the 
racial composition of the school, the percentage 
of students eligible for FRL, and the percentages 
of students who are English language learners or 
receive special education services.7
Tables 1 and 2 provide information on the 
grades and demographics, respectively, of stu-
dents who left the MPCP and enrolled in MPS. 
For purposes of comparison, Table 2 also pres-
ents characteristics for both the population of 
MPS students and the full MPCP evaluation 
sample. A plurality of students—more than 
31%—left the MPCP and enrolled in MPS in 9th 
grade. About 12% to 13% of former MPCP stu-
dents were first observed in MPS in 4th or 10th 
grade, and fewer than 10% of students were first 
observed in MPS in each of the remaining grades. 
In line with the results of Cowen et al. (2012), 
Table 2 illustrates that students who leave the 
MPCP and enroll in MPS are—relative to both 
the population of MPS and the full MPCP evalu-
ation sample—disproportionately Black, low 
achieving, eligible for FRL, and designated for 
academic special needs. In sum, the students who 
leave the MPCP and enroll in MPS are among the 
most disadvantaged along multiple dimensions. 
The following section explores the characteristics 
of the MPS schools into which they enroll.
Destination Public Schools
With more than 100 elementary schools, 
70 middle schools, and 40 high schools, MPS 
possesses a large and variable set of schools that 
students could plausibly attend after leaving the 
voucher program and enrolling in the public 
sector. This sizable and diverse set of schools, 
coupled with the fact that MPS policy allows 
families substantial latitude in selecting the 
school their child will attend, renders it instruc-
tive to examine the characteristics of the MPS 
schools that former MPCP students attend.
School Characteristics
Table 3 presents average demographic and 
academic characteristics of the MPS schools 
that former MPCP students attend in their 1st 
year in MPS. School characteristics are pre-
sented separately for students in Grades 3 
through 8 and 9 through 12. In addition, results 
are presented separately for all students, low-
performing students, and high-performing stu-
dents.8 Average school characteristics for all 
other MPS students are presented for purposes 
of comparison.
The demographic characteristics presented in 
Table 3 are straightforward, but the academic 
characteristics—average WKCE scores and 
school value added—may require further expla-
nation. Average school achievement levels are 
calculated using the data set containing the uni-
verse of MPS students who took the WKCE 
between 2006–2007 and 2010–2011. Separately 
for reading and math, each student’s scale score 
was standardized using the MPS student-level 
mean and standard deviation from the proper 
year and grade. These standardized scores were 
TABLE 1
First Grade Recorded in MPS for Former MPCP 
Students
Grade n %
3 5 0.5
4 143 13.5
5 102 9.6
6 95 9.0
7 85 8.0
8 68 6.4
9 332 31.3
10 132 12.4
11 92 8.7
12 8 0.8
Total 1,062 100
Note. MPS = Milwaukee Public Schools; MPCP = 
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program.
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then aggregated to the school level to obtain 
each school’s average reading and math achieve-
ment levels.
Average achievement levels are an important 
indicator of school quality, but these levels 
reflect many factors, including the demographic 
composition of the school, neighborhood loca-
tion, and school history. A second measure of 
quality, one based on school value added across 
the 5 years of data we observe, may provide a 
purer indicator of school effectiveness. To 
obtain school value-added, we estimated the fol-
lowing:
 Yijt = βRijt – 1 + θMijt – 1 + ρGit + τHijt + γSj + εijt. (1)
In this model, Y represents the average 
z score on the reading and math portions of the 
WKCE for student i in school j at time t. This 
average achievement is modeled as a function 
of a vector of lagged reading scores, R; a vector 
of lagged math scores, M; a vector of grade 
dummies, G; a vector of student characteristics, 
H; a school fixed effect, S; and an error term, ε.9 
After estimation of this model, which was per-
formed via ordinary least squares, we recovered 
the coefficient estimates associated with the 
school fixed effects. Because the coefficient 
estimates associated with the school fixed effects 
reflect both true differences in school quality and 
measurement error, we used an empirical Bayes 
approach to adjust the estimates (e.g., Hanushek, 
Kain, Rivkin, & Branch, 2007). Intuitively, this 
approach shrinks imprecise estimates toward the 
overall mean; these shrunken estimates were 
then standardized using the MPS mean and stan-
dard deviation to obtain our measure of school 
value added.
Interpretation of the value-added and aver-
age achievement measures differ in a subtle but 
important way. The average achievement mea-
sure indicates the extent to which former MPCP 
students are enrolling into MPS schools with 
higher- or lower-achieving students. The value-
added measures, on the other hand, indicate the 
extent to which students are enrolling into 
schools that are more or less effective at increas-
ing student performance.
The results presented in the top panel of 
Table 3 indicate that—relative to all MPS stu-
dents in Grades 3 through 8—former MPCP 
students attend MPS schools that have, on aver-
age, lower enrollments and significantly larger 
proportions of students who are Black and eli-
gible for FRL. The results also indicate that 
former MPCP students attend schools with 
lower average achievement than the typical 
MPS student. Furthermore, the value-added 
estimates demonstrate that former MPCP stu-
dents attend schools that are somewhat less 
effective than the schools attended by the aver-
age MPS student.10 Similar patterns are observed 
at the high school level, but the differences are 
smaller in magnitude.11
TABLE 2
Demographics of MPS and Former MPCP Students
Individual characteristics
MPS  
(n = 73,786)
Formerly MPCP 
(n = 1,062)
Full MPCP evaluation 
sample (n = 3,669)
Black .58 .75 .67
Hispanic .21 .17 .22
White .13 .04 .08
Asian .05 .04 .03
Female .49 .49 .54
Free/reduced lunch .79 .84 .70a
English language learner .07 .05 .09a
Special needs .18 .11 .08a
Mean baseline WKCE Reading 0.00 –.35 –.14
Mean baseline WKCE Math 0.00 –.44 –.27
Note. MPS = Milwaukee Public Schools; MPCP = Milwaukee Parental Choice Program; WKCE = Wisconsin Knowledge and 
Concepts Examination.
a. Figures are based on 3,398 (for free/reduced-priced lunch), 2,519 (for special needs), and 3,518 (for English language learner) 
sample sizes, as these classifications are not maintained by all MPCP schools.
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TABLE 3
School Characteristics for Current MPS Students and Former MPCP Students
School characteristics
Grades 3–8 Grades 9–12
Former MPCP 
students
All other MPS 
students
Former MPCP 
students
All other MPS 
students
All students
 Black
 Hispanic
 White
 Asian 
 Female
 Free/reduced lunch
 English language learners
 Special needs
 Total enrollment
 Average WKCE Math
 Average WKCE Reading
 Average value-added math
 Average value-added reading
0.71
0.14
0.07
0.05
0.48
0.86
0.06
0.19
331.24
–0.17
–0.16
0.11
0.15
0.56
0.23
0.13
0.05
0.49
0.81
0.09
0.18
359.42
0.00
0.00
0.19
0.22
0.66
0.19
0.08
0.05
0.50
0.74
0.05
0.18
204.81
–0.14
–0.13
NA
NA
0.63
0.19
0.11
0.05
0.50
0.72
0.06
0.18
266.37
–0.01
–0.02
NA
NA
Low-performing students
 Black
 Hispanic
 White
 Asian 
 Female
 Free/reduced lunch
 English language learners
 Special needs
 Total enrollment
 Average WKCE Math
 Average WKCE Reading
 Average value-added math
 Average value-added reading
0.74
0.13
0.05
0.04
0.47
0.87
0.05
0.20
322.84
–0.24
–0.22
0.04
0.10
0.63
0.21
0.09
0.04
0.48
0.85
0.09
0.19
345.03
–0.14
–0.15
0.11
0.15
0.66
0.19
0.08
0.05
0.48
0.75
0.07
0.19
200.12
–0.19
–0.18
NA
NA
0.67
0.18
0.08
0.05
0.49
0.76
0.06
0.20
234.59
–0.21
–0.21
NA
NA
High-performing students
 Black
 Hispanic
 White
 Asian 
 Female
 Free/reduced lunch
 English language learners
 Special needs
 Total enrollment
 Average WKCE Math
 Average WKCE Reading
 Average value-added math
 Average value-added reading
0.66
0.15
0.08
0.07
0.49
0.84
0.06
0.19
337.94
–0.10
–0.09
0.18
0.20
0.52
0.24
0.16
0.05
0.49
0.78
0.09
0.17
367.11
0.08
0.08
0.24
0.26
0.61
0.22
0.09
0.05
0.51
0.73
0.06
0.16
215.61
–0.03
–0.03
NA
NA
0.59
0.19
0.14
0.05
0.51
0.70
0.06
0.16
289.34
0.13
0.11
NA
NA
Note. MPS = Milwaukee Public Schools; MPCP = Milwaukee Parental Choice Program; WKCE = Wisconsin Knowledge and 
Concepts Examination; NA = not applicable. All cells are mean proportions except average WKCE scores and average value-
added estimates. Average WKCE scores are school-aggregated average scores standardized using the student-level MPS mean 
and standard deviation. Average value-added estimates are school-level estimates standardized using the school-level MPS 
mean and standard deviation.
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As noted earlier, Table 3 disaggregates each 
comparison for low- and high-achieving stu-
dents. Within each sector, low-performing stu-
dents attend schools with lower enrollments and 
larger proportions of students who are Black 
and eligible for FRL, relative to their higher-
achieving peers. Additionally, relative to 
high-achieving students, the schools of low- 
achieving students have lower average achieve-
ment and are estimated to be less effective. 
Across sectors, it is clear that—for both low- 
and high-achieving students—former MPCP 
students attend schools that are both lower per-
forming and less effective than those attended 
by the typical low- or high-performing MPS 
student, respectively.
Student Choice Sets
To further explore the quality of the MPS 
schools attended by former MPCP students, we 
estimate a simple model of school attendance. 
The first step in this analysis involves construct-
ing the choice set of MPS schools that are theo-
retical options for each ex-MPCP student to 
attend in the year they first enroll in MPS. For 
each student, we define the choice set as all 
schools that serve the student’s grade and were 
in operation during the year the student first 
enrolled in MPS. We recognize that features of 
MPS policy, to say nothing of practicality, likely 
results in this defined choice set being an over-
statement of a student’s operative choice set. 
With respect to policy, although MPS provides 
families with substantial latitude in selecting the 
school their child will attend, the district does 
not provide transportation to schools outside of a 
student’s transportation region. Similarly, 
whereas the enrollment process for most MPS 
schools occurs in January, there are approximately 
two dozen middle and high schools that enroll 
students under a separate “early admission” pro-
gram that takes place in the fall.12 Practically, 
families are unlikely to seriously consider 
attending schools located a substantial distance 
from their residence.
However, two reasons underlie our belief 
that this definition of the choice set represents the 
most cautious analytical option. First, any effort to 
constrain the choice set based on seemingly rea-
sonable decision rules—such as excluding early 
admission schools or schools beyond a given 
transportation region—invariably resulted in the 
exclusion of schools that students attend, which 
is clearly problematic.13 Such exclusions are 
consistent with the fact that although policy and 
practicality likely serve to limit a student’s 
operative choice set, they do not formally pre-
vent attendance at any school. Thus, our expan-
sive definition of the choice set is consistent 
with MPS’s stated policy of allowing parents to 
send their child to any MPS school with avail-
able seats, regardless of whether it is in their 
neighborhood catchment area. Second, many of 
the policy- and practicality-induced limitations 
are related to a student’s distance from a given 
school, and we are able to account for this factor 
in the models that follow.
After constructing this choice set for each 
student, we estimate a (conditional) logistic 
regression model containing student fixed 
effects, which account for the student-specific 
set of schooling options within our broad frame-
work. The model can be generally written as 
follows:
 Pr(Sij = 1) = logit
–1(δAj + θDij + γi), (2)
where S represents schools in an individual’s 
choice set, i and j index individuals and schools, 
respectively, A represents a measure of school 
quality (we estimate models where quality is 
measured as average achievement levels as well 
as school value added), D represents a vector of 
distance measures between an individual’s cen-
sus tract and the location of the school, γ is a 
student fixed effect, and logit–1(x) = ex / (1 + ex). 
The vector of distance variables contains first-, 
second-, and third-order terms, which are 
intended to capture the policy- and practicality-
related constraints described earlier. It is impor-
tant to note that this model is not intended to 
estimate parameters in a preference function but 
is rather designed to provide descriptive infor-
mation on the quality of MPS schools into 
which former MPCP students enroll, given a set 
of plausible schooling options and accounting 
for distance-related constraints.
We estimate Equation 2 via maximum like-
lihood with standard errors clustered at the stu-
dent level. The model is estimated separately for 
students in Grades 3 through 8 and 9 through 12. 
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In addition, we estimate the model separately for 
high-performing students and low-performing 
students. Results from the estimation of these 
models are presented in Table 4. For all students 
in Grades 3 through 8, after accounting for dis-
tance, there is no relationship between student 
attendance and average achievement levels in a 
school but a small positive relationship between 
student attendance and school value added; stu-
dents are no more likely to attend a school with 
low average achievement than with high aver-
age achievement, but they are slightly more 
likely to attend more effective schools.
The results for all students mask notable dif-
ferences in the relationship between student 
attendance and school quality for low- and high-
performing students. Specifically, conditional on 
distance and given their set of plausible schooling 
options, high-performing students in Grades 3 
through 8 are more likely to attend schools that 
are both higher performing and more effective. 
Low-performing students, on the other hand, are 
more likely to attend schools with lower average 
achievement, although there is no relationship 
between student attendance and school value 
added. At the high school level, there is a posi-
tive relationship between student attendance and 
average achievement levels; this relationship 
holds for all students, low-performing students, 
and high-performing students, although the rela-
tionship is stronger for high-performing students 
than for low-performing students. As noted ear-
lier, we are unable to obtain reliable school 
value-added estimates at the high school level. 
Finally, consistent with previous studies 
(Hastings, Kane, & Staiger, 2009; Carlson, 
Lavery, & Witte, 2011), as well as the issues of 
policy and practicality described previously, the 
results indicate that distance plays a large con-
straining role in school attendance. However, the 
fact that the second-order term is positive and 
significant suggests that the constraining role of 
distance is not absolute, which one may expect 
given MPS’s stated school attendance policy.
TABLE 4
Coefficients and Standard Errors From Logit Models Predicting School Attendance Decisions
All students High-performing students Low-performing students
Variable Mean Value added Mean Value added Mean Value added
Grades 3–8
 Mean z score 0.0283 0.353*** –0.278**
(0.0773) (0.108) (0.109)
 School value added 0.0857* 0.312*** –0.0807
(0.0469) (0.0755) (0.0570)
 Distance –0.922*** –0.916*** –1.160*** –1.145*** –0.832*** –0.827***
(0.135) (0.135) (0.182) (0.183) (0.160) (0.160)
 Distance squared 0.0869*** 0.0860*** 0.153*** 0.151*** 0.0570* 0.0554*
(0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0417) (0.0420) (0.0316) (0.0314)
 Distance cubed –0.00323* –0.00321* –0.00771*** –0.00765*** –0.00117 –0.00113
(0.00194) (0.00194) (0.00270) (0.00273) (0.00172) (0.00170)
 Observations 45,735 44,350 22,681 21,940 22,246 21,642
Grades 9–12
 Mean z score 0.488*** 0.997*** 0.247*
(0.0746) (0.152) (0.130)
 Distance –0.386*** –0.211 –0.246
(0.118) (0.226) (0.208)
 Distance squared 0.0319 0.00918 0.00674
(0.0213) (0.0375) (0.0357)
 Distance cubed –0.000675 0.000423 0.000434
(0.00106)  (0.00173)  (0.00173)  
 Observations 28,164  8,156  8,083  
Note. All models contain student fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the student level in parentheses below 
coefficients.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Considered as a whole, the results presented 
in this section provide a variety of information 
on a basic descriptive question: What type of 
public schools do students attend when they 
leave a voucher program? A second question 
logically follows: What happens to their perfor-
mance when they arrive?
Achievement Impacts of Moving 
 From the MPCP to MPS
Addressing this next question involves 
exploring the relationship between student 
achievement and transferring from the MPCP to 
MPS. Before proceeding, however, we caution 
readers from interpreting this analysis as one 
specifically designed to provide evidence on the 
general effectiveness of the public versus private 
sector. Our achievement results focus uniquely 
on students who exit private schools and enroll 
in the public sector, comparing academic out-
comes within these individuals over time.14
In the Background section, we identified 
several factors that have the potential to affect 
the academic outcomes of students who transfer 
from private to public schools. We noted that 
these factors could interact in different ways 
to produce academic outcomes that are—on 
average—worse, similar, or better for students 
who leave the voucher program and enroll in 
MPS. Given the competing theoretical consider-
ations, we estimate a set of models to gain 
empirical insight into the matter. The first we 
specify as follows:
 Ait = MPSit + πit + γi + εit (3)
In this model, i and t index students and time, 
respectively, A represents a measure of standard-
ized student achievement, MPS is a variable 
indicating whether student i had transferred to 
MPS by time t, π represents a vector of grade-by-
year fixed effects, γ is a student fixed effect, and ε is 
an error term. The fact that students are tested only 
once in high school—in 10th grade—complicates 
efforts to assess the achievement effects of transfer-
ring from the MPCP to MPS during high school. 
As a result, we estimate Equation 3 using the 
sample of students who were first observed in 
MPS in Grades 3 through 8. We estimate sepa-
rate models for reading and math.
Equation 3 accounts for time-invariant stu-
dent characteristics, and thus the estimate of 
MPS should be interpreted as the effect of trans-
ferring into MPS on the level of a student’s 
achievement. If unobserved, time-varying stu-
dent characteristics are correlated with the deci-
sion to transfer, this estimate could be biased 
(see Bifulco & Ladd, 2007). Consequently, to 
assess the robustness of our results to alternative 
modeling approaches, we estimate a second 
model—a value-added model—that measures 
the effect of MPS enrollment on a student’s 
academic growth rather than his or her achieve-
ment level:
 Ait = MPSit + βAit–1 + πit + εit,  (4)
where Ait–1 is student achievement at time 
(t – 1) and the remaining contents of the 
model were described previously.15 Separate 
models are again estimated for reading and math. 
Because Equation 4 contains a measure of lagged 
achievement, the analytic samples for Equations 3 
and 4 are necessarily different. To assess the 
extent to which any divergent results from the 
fixed-effects and value-added approaches are 
the result of different analytic samples—as 
opposed to resulting from the different model-
ing techniques—we also estimate Equation 3 
using the value-added analytic sample. A final 
note on these samples is warranted. Although 
the analytic sample for Equation 3 contains an 
average of 3.5 observations per student, these 
observations are split approximately evenly 
between the pre- and post-transfer periods. 
Consequently, we have an average of just fewer 
than 2 post-transfer observations for the aver-
age student, meaning we must interpret the 
results as relatively short-term impacts, particu-
larly given the fall administration of the WKCE. 
This does not limit our ability to address the 
question of what happens to students after 
transferring, but it does imply that we can say 
little about their longer term career trajectories 
as they persist in public school. Additional 
analyses in the following section attempt to 
address the impact of post-transfer sample size 
on these results.
Results from the estimation of these models 
are presented in Table 5. Whether we consider 
the fixed-effects estimates of Equation 3 or the 
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value-added estimates of Equation 4, these 
results indicate that former voucher students 
exhibit significant achievement increases in 
both reading and math after they transfer to the 
public schools. Because outcomes are standard-
ized against the MPS mean, we may interpret 
the coefficients in Table 5 directly as effect 
sizes. In most cases, the magnitude of these 
estimates is substantial, comparing favorably to 
the effects of several well-known interventions, such 
as class size reduction (Krueger, 1999). Table 5 also 
disaggregates the results by student achievement 
level. These specifications indicate that, if any-
thing, low-achieving students benefit from trans-
ferring from the MPCP to MPS to a greater extent 
than high-achieving students; in each subject, and 
across both estimation strategies, the MPS coef-
ficient estimate for low-achieving students is 
larger than that for high-achieving students. In 
one sense, these results may come as somewhat 
of a surprise, given that the previous section 
demonstrated that low-performing students 
attend lower performing, less effective schools 
than their high-achieving peers. We explore this 
issue further—and discuss the broader implica-
tions of the results presented in Table 5—in the 
following sections.
Additional Specifications  
and Possible Explanations
The finding that students exhibit a substantial 
increase in achievement after transferring from the 
MPCP to MPS is robust to a variety of specifica-
tions and analytical approaches. With such consis-
tency, the next natural set of questions concerns 
the factors that may be responsible for the observed 
achievement increases. The Background section 
TABLE 5
Coefficients and Standard Errors From Models Predicting Student Achievement
Fixed effect Value added Fixed effect; value-added sample
Variable (1) Math (2) Reading (3) Math (4) Reading (5) Math (6) Reading
All students
 Enrolled in MPS 0.221*** 0.205*** 0.175*** 0.151*** 0.154** 0.187***
(0.0564) (0.0534) (0.0568) (0.0571) (0.0598) (0.0565)
 Lagged test score 0.617*** 0.606***
(0.0290) (0.0312)
 Observations 1,709 1,713 1,121 1,128 1,121 1,128
 R2 0.081 0.071 0.438 0.410 0.086 0.090
 Number of students 494 494   467 468
Low-performing students
 Enrolled in MPS 0.277*** 0.279*** 0.225** 0.231*** 0.156 0.244**
(0.0958) (0.0856) (0.0897) (0.0873) (0.111) (0.0947)
 Lagged test score 0.524*** 0.490***
(0.0446) (0.0493)
 Observations 855 858 558 565 558 565
 R2 0.137 0.185 0.321 0.280 0.104 0.138
 Number of students 241 241   233 233
High-performing students
 Enrolled in MPS 0.167** 0.121* 0.144** 0.0655 0.142** 0.126*
(0.0648) (0.0655) (0.0709) (0.0766) (0.0630) (0.0682)
 Lagged test score 0.663*** 0.687***
(0.0434) (0.0480)
 Observations 854 855 563 563 563 563
 R2 0.094 0.094 0.451 0.364 0.124 0.151
 Number of students 253 253   234 235
Note. MPS = Milwaukee Public Schools. Robust standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All models contain grade-
by-year fixed effects.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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identified several factors that have the potential 
to affect the academic outcomes of students 
who leave a voucher program and enroll in the 
public sector; this section is devoted to explor-
ing possible relationships between those factors 
and the results observed in Table 5.
Regression to the Mean or Single-Year Impacts
Previous studies have demonstrated that stu-
dents often leave voucher programs after one or 
more years of poor academic performance 
(Howell, 2004; Cowen et al., 2012). Such a 
finding raises the possibility that the positive 
MPS achievement results may be attributable to 
simple mean reversion (e.g. Ashenfelter, 1978). 
If this is the case, the implications of the results 
presented in Table 5 are far different than if 
the observed achievement increases were attrib-
utable to another, perhaps more fundamental, 
factor.
We investigated the possibility of mean rever-
sion in several ways. First, following Imberman 
(2011), we recovered residuals from a model 
predicting achievement as a function of all vari-
ables in Equation 3 save the MPS indicator; the 
residuals essentially represent student achieve-
ment demeaned by student and year-by-grade 
fixed effects. The mean residuals, which are 
plotted in Figure 1 along with their 95% confi-
dence intervals, reveal no evidence of a 1-year 
dip prior to transfer in either subject. To the 
contrary, there is some evidence that achieve-
ment steadily declined in the years prior to trans-
fer but rose in the 1st years after students trans-
ferred to MPS, although this rise appears to taper 
off by the 3rd year post-transfer for the small 
sample of students we observe that late in the 
data. Although present across both subjects, this 
pattern is somewhat more distinct for math than 
for reading.
Our second approach replaces the measure of 
lagged achievement in Equation 4 with a mea-
sure of twice-lagged achievement. If students 
transferred after an especially poor academic 
year, then twice-lagged achievement may be a 
better measure of their true underlying ability 
and thus provides a better estimate of the true 
effect of transferring from the MPCP to MPS. 
Table 6 illustrates that the math results are 
robust to the inclusion of a measure of twice-
lagged achievement. In reading, the point esti-
mate on the MPS coefficient remains positive 
but fails to reach statistical significance. The 
failure to reach significance is attributable, at 
least in part, to the fact that estimating a model 
FIGURE 1. Student achievement before and after transfer to Milwaukee Public Schools.
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with twice-lagged achievement substantially 
reduces the size of the analytic sample.
Our final set of specifications informs an 
exploration of possible mean reversion, but it is 
also relevant to an analysis of possible heteroge-
neity in the achievement effects of transferring 
from the MPCP to MPS. First, we estimated—
net of student fixed effects—year-specific coef-
ficients for MPS enrollment for each of the first 
2 years after transfer. If mean reversion were 
responsible for the results in Table 5, then we 
would expect the coefficients for the 1st-year 
post-transfer indicator to be larger than the coef-
ficients for the 2nd-year post-transfer indicator. 
The results—presented in the second panel of 
Table 6—demonstrate no such pattern. In gen-
eral, the differences between the estimates for 
the 2 years are slight and exhibit no systematic 
pattern. Second, we estimated Equations 3 and 
4 using our sample after dropping each stu-
dent’s first post-transfer observation. The results 
of this analysis—presented in the bottom panel 
of Table 6—are positive and significant in the 
fixed-effects specifications and positive but 
insignificant in the growth specifications. 
Similar to the twice-lagged approach described 
earlier, the growth specification loses a consid-
erable number of student-year observations, 
which is likely partially responsible for the lack 
of significance.16
The results presented in Figure 1 and Table 6 
provide a generally consistent substantive story. 
Prior to transferring to MPS, students experi-
ence a multiyear slide in achievement. After 
enrolling in the public schools, students exhibit 
a notable increase in their math and reading 
scores. The achievement growth occurs most 
intensely in the 1st year post-transfer but 
appears to continue into the 2nd year as well. 
Considered as a whole, the evidence indicates 
that the results presented in Table 5 are not 
attributable, at least wholly, to a reversion to 
the mean after an uncharacteristically poor aca-
demic year in the MPCP.
TABLE 6
Results of Regression to the Mean Analyses
Math Reading
Variable
Value  
added
Fixed effect;  
value-added sample
Value  
added
Fixed effect;  
value-added sample
Two-year lag
 Enrolled in MPS 0.167** NA 0.059 NA
(0.078)  (0.082)  
 Observations 737 739
 R2 0.35  0.38  
MPS year indicators
 1st year in MPS 0.192*** 0.071 0.171*** 0.162
(0.065) (0.086) (0.065) (0.101)
 2nd year in MPS 0.155** 0.114 0.055 0.164
(0.070) (0.128) (0.073) (0.169)
 Observations 969 969 975 975
 Number of students  463  464
 R2 0.42 0.10 0.38 0.09
Excluding first MPS transfer year
 Enrolled in MPS 0.076 0.398*** 0.076 0.340***
(0.068) (0.101) (0.083) (0.115)
 Observations 706 706 709 709
 Number of students  396  397
 R2 0.50 0.03 0.46 0.01
Note. MPS = Milwaukee Public Schools. Robust standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All models contain grade-
by-year fixed effects.
*p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Sector Differences
The Background section identified sector 
differences as a factor that could affect the aca-
demic outcomes of students transferring from the 
MPCP to MPS. Although previous research pro-
vides mixed evidence that the two sectors in 
Milwaukee differ significantly in their general 
effectiveness (Greene et al., 1998; Lamarche, 
2008; Rouse, 1998; Witte, 2000), there are other 
differences that could be relevant to the observed 
achievement increases. Perhaps most notable is 
the fact that during the period our data span, 
NCLB accountability provisions applied to 
MPS schools but not to the private MPCP 
schools. Thus, the stakes for students’ WKCE 
performance were higher in MPS than they 
were in the MPCP.
The results presented in the second panel of 
Table 6, coupled with the fact that the WKCE is 
administered in November of each school year, 
provide evidence relevant to the possible influ-
ence of the differential test stakes. Specifically, 
the results demonstrate that students exhibit a 
substantial increase in achievement during their 
1st year in MPS. Given the timing of the WKCE 
administration, coupled with the evidence on 
the generally similar effectiveness of the two 
sectors, it would be surprising if these achieve-
ment increases were fully attributable to knowl-
edge increases stemming from MPS enrollment. 
Seemingly more plausible is a scenario where 
these 1st-year achievement increases are attrib-
utable to MPS placing a heavier emphasis on 
WKCE performance than on the MPCP.17 Although 
the results presented in Tables 5 and 6 are fully 
consistent with this conjecture, the evidence is 
clearly not definitive.18
A second possible difference between the 
MPCP and MPS concerns student classification 
and retention policy. Anecdotal evidence from 
the formal evaluation of the MPCP has indi-
cated that relative to MPS, private schools in 
Milwaukee are more averse to taking actions 
that may bring negative attention to a student, 
such as formally labeling students as requiring 
special education services or retaining students 
in grade (Wolf, Witte, & Fleming, 2012). Given 
this evidence, it is possible that at least some of 
the achievement gains observed in Table 5 are 
attributable to greater rates of retention in grade 
after transferring to MPS. These gains could 
occur if retention was beneficial in its own right 
or simply by virtue of having students take the 
same test for a 2nd consecutive year. To analyze 
whether the achievement gains are attributable 
to greater rates of retention, we assess 
(a) whether students are more likely to be retained 
after transferring to MPS and (b), if so, whether 
the results in Table 5 persist after accounting for 
student retention.
Table 7 reports linear probability estimates 
of the effect that transferring to MPS has on the 
probability of student retention.19 The table 
includes results from various specifications, but 
the findings are consistent: Former MPCP stu-
dents are between 2 and 9 percentage points 
more likely to be retained after enrolling in 
MPS, depending on the estimation strategy and 
the analytic sample. These results indicate that 
TABLE 7
Coefficient and Standard Errors for MPS Variable From Linear Probability Models Predicting Student 
Retention
Enrolled in MPS 0.030*** 
(0.011)
0.030*** 
(0.011)
0.084*** 
(0.012)
0.021** 
(0.009)
0.021** 
(0.009)
0.094*** 
(0.012)
Lagged reading test score? Yes No No Yes No No
Student fixed effects? No No No Yes Yes Yes
Estimated using sample with 
lagged score?
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
N 2,083 2,083 2,940 2,130 2,130 2,998
Number of students 896 896 1011 920 920 1038
Note. MPS = Milwaukee Public Schools. Models without student fixed effects contain an MPS indicator, year and grade fixed 
effects, and measures of special needs, English language learner, and free and reduced-price lunch status. Models containing 
student fixed effects contain an MPS indicator. Standard errors adjusted for clustering in parentheses below coefficients.
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given the same students, retention is a strategy 
more commonly employed in public schools 
than in private schools, but they do not appear to 
explain our results in Table 5; the results are 
robust to specifications that include an indicator 
for student retention.20
Change in Educational Environment
The Background section noted that any trans-
fer from one school to another is likely to result 
in changes in the environment in which a student 
is educated and that such changes have the 
potential to affect academic outcomes. Assessing 
changes in the educational environment—and by 
extension, relating these changes to the observed 
achievement increases—requires data on (a) the 
MPCP schools that students attended and 
(b) the MPS schools into which students 
enroll. The Data section presented the charac-
teristics of the MPS schools into which students 
enroll, but our data—and all other data of which 
we are aware—do not permit calculation of reli-
able measures of quality or demographic compo-
sition of the MPCP schools.21 Consequently, we 
are unable to discern how students’ transfers 
from the MPCP to MPS may have changed their 
educational environments.
Our inability to assess the extent to which 
transferring from the MPCP to MPS resulted in 
a change in school or peer quality highlights the 
potential benefits of more thorough data collec-
tion on student achievement and the demo-
graphic composition of private schools, particu-
larly those receiving public funding for their 
operations. Access to private school data permit-
ting estimation of changes in school and peer 
quality would inform several issues arising from 
the analyses in the previous section. Most cen-
trally, it would allow for an assessment of the 
relationship between changes in school or peer 
quality and changes in achievement when stu-
dents transfer from the MPCP to MPS. It would 
also allow for inquiry into other—perhaps less 
central but no less important—questions. For 
example, Table 5 demonstrates that despite 
enrolling into MPS schools that are lower per-
forming and less effective, low-achieving stu-
dents exhibit greater achievement gains after 
enrolling in MPS than their higher achieving 
peers. A reasonable hypothesis for explaining 
this empirical finding holds that the low-
achieving students attended very low-quality 
MPCP schools and thus experienced larger 
changes in school and peer quality than did 
higher achieving students after transferring to 
MPS. However, until data exist to empirically 
test this—or any other—hypothesis, it remains 
just that.
Disruptive Effects of Switching Schools
As noted previously, a large body of litera-
ture has demonstrated that switching schools 
exerts a negative effect on academic achieve-
ment, at least in the years immediately follow-
ing the switch. In the context of this study, the 
fact that students’ achievement increased when 
they left the MPCP and enrolled in MPS does 
not preclude the possibility that switching 
schools exerted a disruptive effect on achieve-
ment; such effects were apparently overwhelmed 
by factors—a number of possibilities were dis-
cussed earlier—working to increase achievement. 
Unfortunately, our data do not permit isolation 
of the specific contribution of the disruptive 
effects of switching schools on the achievement 
results presented in Table 5. Attempting to 
determine the relative achievement-related con-
tributions of the various factors discussed in this 
section—and perhaps others—represents a nat-
ural line of future inquiry.
Discussion and Conclusion
Substantively, the analyses presented earlier 
tell a compelling, multipart story. After leaving 
the MPCP, students tend to enroll in MPS 
schools that are lower performing and less 
effective than those attended by the typical MPS 
student. Perhaps not surprisingly, high-achieving 
transfers enroll into higher quality MPS schools 
than do their lower achieving peers. In general, 
all students who transfer to the public sector 
realize significant achievement gains after doing 
so, although these gains are estimated to be 
larger for low-performing students than for their 
higher achieving peers—a somewhat surprising 
finding, given the characteristics of the schools 
attended by these two groups of students.
As made clear in the previous section, the 
observed achievement increases resulting from 
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a move to MPS from the MPCP could be attrib-
utable to any of several factors, including sector 
differences and changes in school or peer quality. 
To the extent our data allow, we investigated the 
possible explanatory power of each of these fac-
tors. However, because of data limitations, the 
specific contributions of these factors—and thus 
the precise mechanism driving these results—
remains within an ill-defined black box, just as it 
often is on the private or charter side in studies 
that consider switches to those alternatives. 
Regardless of the mechanism, however, the 
findings presented in this article have important 
implications for research and policy.
With respect to research, the results pre-
sented in this article generate a set of analytical 
implications for school choice research. The 
striking feature of these results is not their indi-
cation that students who exit the voucher pro-
gram are low performers—such a pattern is 
demonstrated elsewhere by Cowen et al. (2012) 
and Howell (2004)—but that switchers exhibit 
achievement increases after arriving in the public 
sector. Given other results demonstrating little dif-
ference in the performance of a representative 
sample of voucher students and a matched panel of 
MPS students across 5 years (Witte, Carlson, 
Cowen, Fleming, & Wolf, 2011), this implies that 
a substantial degree of treatment heterogeneity 
may exist within the MPCP and choice programs 
more generally. Such heterogeneity implies that 
even unbiased estimates of average treatment 
effects of school choice programs may not provide 
the entire set of policy-relevant information. For 
example, estimates generated from designs lever-
aging student transfers—such as fixed-effects 
approaches—may be smaller than the effects for a 
broader population of students. Similarly, esti-
mates based on students who remain in their 
respective sectors for a fixed period—as may be 
the case in matching designs—seem likely to be 
larger than what would be observed in expecta-
tion across the population of potential partici-
pants. Such a reality suggests that evaluators 
would do well to explicitly identify their esti-
mand and discuss the population to which their 
findings may be generalizable. It also illustrates 
the benefits of attempting to empirically assess 
the extent of treatment heterogeneity.
Along with these research implications, the 
findings presented in this article also have 
implications for policy. First, they provide 
evidence—albeit equivocal—on the ability of 
students to attend high-quality schools that 
result in improved academic outcomes. On one 
hand, our results demonstrate that former MPCP 
students attend MPS schools that are lower per-
forming and less effective than the schools 
attended by the typical MPS student. On the 
other hand, our results also illustrate that given 
the set of schools that a student could theoreti-
cally attend, and accounting for the constraint of 
distance, there was a slight positive relationship 
between school effectiveness and student atten-
dance; this relationship was strongly positive for 
high achieving students and nonexistent for low-
achieving students. Furthermore, students 
exhibit significant achievement gains after trans-
fer to the public sector, and these gains are larger 
for low-achieving students than for their higher 
achieving peers. Together, these results raise 
several questions. Are low-achieving students 
leaving particularly ineffective MPCP schools 
and—even though they attend MPS schools that 
are on average less effective—experiencing an 
increase in school quality after transferring to 
MPS? Could the observed achievement increases 
for low-achieving students be even larger if they 
attended a higher-quality MPS school? Do MPS 
schools vary in their effectiveness for low- and 
high-performing students? Addressing such 
questions is either beyond the scope of this arti-
cle or not possible given our data but would be a 
natural topic for future research.
Concerns have been voiced that granting 
families the ability to choose their schools will 
result in greater stratification along academic 
and demographic dimensions. The results pre-
sented in this article demonstrate that such con-
cerns may be warranted: Low-achieving stu-
dents attend MPS schools that are, by accepted 
measures, of lower quality than the MPS schools 
attended by their higher achieving peers. At the 
same time, however, low-achieving students 
exhibit greater achievement gains than do trans-
fers who exhibit better performance, a fact that 
complicates a normative interpretation of any 
potential stratification.
Finally, our results can inform debates on 
public and private school effectiveness by sug-
gesting that the answers to such questions may 
be different for different students. This may be 
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particularly true in environments where several 
schooling options are available to most students. 
Throughout this article, we have noted that the 
official evaluation of the MPCP found very lit-
tle difference in the performance of representa-
tive voucher students and a matched panel of 
MPS students across 5 years, suggesting that on 
average, these sectors are doing a comparable 
job of educating typical students. However, the 
achievement gains observed for students who 
leave the MPCP and enroll in MPS imply that 
there exists a class of students who performed 
poorly in the voucher sector and who are subse-
quently served at least as well, if not better, by 
the traditional public sector. Few school choice 
supporters would suggest that private or charter 
schools are for everyone, and in the context of 
high between-sector mobility that we and other 
scholars have observed, it would be troubling if 
the average student who exited a choice pro-
gram suffered, or continued to suffer, achieve-
ment losses after the transfer. Our results indi-
cate that such a negative impact is not apparent, 
on average. This would be consistent with the 
more optimistic interpretations of a mature 
high-choice environment: Students sort between 
schooling options until they settle on the 
option—public or private—that is best suited to 
their needs.
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Notes
1. In addition to studies that analyze the character-
istics of students who leave school voucher pro-
grams, a small literature also considered students 
who leave charter schools and enroll in traditional 
public schools (e.g., Bettinger, 2005; Bifulco & 
Ladd, 2006, 2007).
2. The most closely related line of research on 
these topics consists of studies that have used student 
fixed-effects approaches as an identification strategy 
for estimating the effect of charter school attendance 
on student achievement (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; 
Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin, & Branch, 2007; Sass, 
2006). In doing so, these studies implicitly estimate 
the effect of leaving one sector and enrolling in the 
other. The three major studies employing this identi-
fication strategy return a mixed set of results. Sass 
(2006) and Hanushek et al. (2007) find that after an 
initial start-up period in which charter school atten-
dance results in lower achievement, there is no differ-
ence in the performance of charter schools and public 
schools after about 5 years. Bifulco and Ladd (2006) 
find that charter school attendance results in lower 
levels of student achievement throughout the full 
period of observation.
3. For most of its existence, private schools par-
ticipating in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program 
(MPCP) were not subject to any formal test-based 
accountability policy. However, beginning in 2010–
2011, state law required private schools participating 
in the MPCP to administer reading and math tests to 
all students in Grades 3 through 8 and Grade 10 and 
submit the results to the Wisconsin Department of 
Public Instruction for public reporting.
4. In general, discerning the nature of a transfer is 
not possible with our data. However, a structural fea-
ture of the MPCP—the smaller number of available 
seats and schools at the high school level—implies that 
reactive transfers may be disproportionately likely to 
occur after Grade 8. In Grades K through 8, the aver-
age grade-level enrollment in the MPCP in 2009–2010 
was 1,704. In Grades 9 through 12, the average grade-
level enrollment in the program was 1,001. Moreover, 
only 34 out of the 120 schools participating in the 
MPCP serve high school grades. Consequently, when 
possible, we analyze transfers that occurred in Grades 
3 through 8 separately from those that took place in 
Grades 9 through 12.
5. In each year, 450 to 500 MPCP third-graders 
were added to the original sample.
6. The population of MPCP students was not 
required to take the Wisconsin Knowledge and 
Concepts Examination (WKCE) until 2010, and that 
requirement came from Wisconsin statute, not from 
the federal No Child Left Behind law. Consequently, 
the WKCE tests scores from MPCP are available only 
for the panelists whose tests were collected as part of 
the state-mandated evaluation that ran from 2006 to 
2010 (Witte et al., 2008).
7. To the extent that the population of test takers in 
Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) differs from the 
population of students in MPS, the school-level char-
acteristics computed from the file containing the 
universe of test takers may differ from the true values 
for these characteristics. There are two primary sce-
narios that could result in the population of test takers 
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differing from the population of MPS students. First, 
the characteristics of students in tested grades could 
differ from the characteristics of students in untested 
grades. This is unlikely to be the case. Second, among 
students in tested grades, the characteristics of stu-
dents who take the test could differ from students 
who do not take the test. However, because of No 
Child Left Behind’s strict requirement that nearly all 
students in tested grades sit for the assessment, the 
population of test takers is very close to the popula-
tion of all students in tested grades.
8. Low- and high-performing students are defined 
by their reading test scores. Low-performing students 
are defined as students who scored below the median 
of students who transferred from the MPCP to MPS. 
High-performing students are defined as students 
who scored above the median of students who trans-
ferred from the MPCP to MPS. The results do not 
differ substantively if math scores or the average of 
math and reading scores are used as the basis for clas-
sifying students as low or high performing.
9. The vector of lagged reading scores contains a 
1-year lag of the student’s standardized score as well 
as squared and cubed terms of that lag. The vector of 
lagged math scores contains an identical set of terms. 
The vector of grade dummies contains indicators for 
Grades 4 through 8, with Grade 10 serving as the 
omitted category. The vector of student characteris-
tics includes indicators for gender, race, English lan-
guage learner status, free or reduced-price lunch sta-
tus, and special-needs status.
10. The fact that the average school value-added 
estimates are positive for the average MPS students 
indicates higher enrollment levels in the more effec-
tive schools.
11. We are unable to estimate a reliable school 
value-added measure at the high school level because 
of the fact that Equation 1 contains lagged achieve-
ment measures and students are tested only once 
(10th grade) in high school.
12. See http://mpsportal.milwaukee.k12.wi.us/ 
portal/server.pt/doc/74435/Directions+Booklet+-+2011 
for a description of MPS transportation policy as well 
as a brief discussion of the early admission process. 
Note that the features of this policy may limit the gen-
eralizability of these findings to future voucher settings 
where the public options are also highly diverse. 
13. Nearly 400 of the approximately 1,000 former 
MPCP students in our sample attended an early 
admission school when they transferred to MPS.
14. Drawing general causal conclusions on the 
relative effectiveness of the public and private sectors 
would require a between-student analysis using a 
research design that rendered sector assignment 
exogenous. Because we do not believe our data 
allow such an analysis, we maintain a strict focus on 
within-student comparisons to estimate the effect of 
transferring in this article. Descriptive evidence of 
the between-sector differences are reported in terms 
of both achievement and attainment (e.g., high school 
graduation) in the official evaluation reports we note 
earlier (Witte et al., 2011). But those reports likewise 
conceded no ability to control for unobserved differ-
ences between voucher recipients and public school 
attendees that may also be correlated with outcomes.
15. We also estimated a variant of Equation 3 in 
which a student’s gain score is used as the outcome 
measure. In this case, the student fixed effect removes 
the average gain in achievement as opposed to the 
average achievement level. The results from estima-
tion of this specification are substantively similar and 
are available from the authors by request. In addition, 
we estimated a variant of Equation 4 that contains a 
student fixed effect. Although this is not our preferred 
specification—because of the fact that the fixed effect 
would result in differencing each term in Equation 4, 
which renders the error functionally correlated with 
the differenced lagged achievement variable and thus 
biases the estimates—the results are robust to its esti-
mation. These results are also available from the 
authors by request.
16. Substantively similar results were also obtained 
when estimating Equations 3 and 4 using a sample of 
students who had at least 4 years of observations, 
implying that our results are robust to an estimation 
using our most complete post-transfer sample.
17. Further evidence in support of this scenario 
comes from this fact that beginning in 2010–2011, 
MPCP schools became subject to an accountability 
policy that possessed similarities to No Child Left 
Behind. Research into the effects of introducing this 
policy into the private schools revealed achievement 
increases comparable in magnitude to those presented 
in Table 5 (Cowen, Carlson, & Fleming, 2012).
18. As an anonymous reviewer has helpfully pointed 
out, also ambiguous is an interpretation of public school 
effectiveness for students who have, in their first MPS 
year, spent only 2 or 3 months in that sector. The speci-
fication of our primary models implies that transferring 
sectors is associated with gains in both achievement 
levels and growth for these students, but it is difficult to 
assign full credit for this difference to MPS after only a 
short time. Perhaps simply the act of leaving a difficult, 
alternative sector results in average positive impacts. 
Such a scenario is especially consistent with Table 2 
and earlier investigations of these students while they 
are in the MPCP (Cowen et al., 2012), which both indi-
cate that students who leave the MPCP are among the 
worst performers there, suggesting they are those least 
likely to benefit from the voucher.
19. The retention indicator is coded 1 for the sec-
ond consecutive year a student is enrolled in a given 
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grade and 0 otherwise. We also estimated a series of 
logit models predicting student retention, and the 
marginal effects of the MPS coefficients are sub-
stantively similar to the linear probability model 
(LPM) estimates presented in Table 7.
20. An anonymous reviewer has helpfully noted 
that such a model does not conclusively eliminate the 
possibility that retention is driving some of the results 
here. The potentially endogenous relationship 
between achievement and transfer does not allow 
exogenous entry of the retention indicator into the 
model in Equation 2. On the other hand, if the small 
number of students retained were entirely responsible 
for the results, we should at minimum expect some 
sensitivity to an inclusion of that dummy, which we 
do not observe; these results are available by request.
21. As noted in the Data section, our data on the 
MPCP program contain approximately 3,500 unique 
students attending more than 100 private schools. 
Consequently, we have an average of fewer than 
35 students per school, a number insufficient to 
obtain reliable measures of school quality or demo-
graphic composition.
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